This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which …rms can choose between a ‡exible production technology which allows them to produce two di¤erent products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the ‡exible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict pro…t maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one …rm adopts the ‡exible technology can be sustained under strategic delegation but not under strict pro…t maximization when products are substitutes. We extend the analysis to consider welfare implications.
Introduction
Although it is generally accepted that modern corporations are characterized by a division between ownership and management, technology choice literature usually treats …rms as economic agents which maximize strict pro…ts (see for example Bester and Petrakis (1993) , Röller and Tombak (1990) ). Seeking to set our study in a more realistic framework, we analyze the incentives to adopt ‡exible technologies in a managerial strategic delegation model.
The literature on strategic delegation (see Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987) ), analyzes the incentive contracts that owners of competing …rms give their managers and how these incentive contracts a¤ect the oligopoly outcome. These studies show that …rms' owners are interested in driving their managers away from strict pro…t maximization for strategic reasons.
In this work, like Fershtman and Judd (1987) , we assume that …rms'managers will be given an incentive to maximize an objective function consisting of a linear combination of pro…ts and sales revenue. We consider that …rms have to choose between two production technologies: a ‡exible technology, which allows …rms to produce two di¤erent products and a dedicated technology which limits production to a single product. We analyze how strategic delegation contracts a¤ect …rms'decisions between these two types of technology.
Let us …rst explain the di¤erence between ‡exible and dedicated technologies. Elkins et al. (2003) de…ne a dedicated machining system as that which can produce only a single product model. By contrast, a ‡exible machining system is an adaptable system that can change quickly and easily to produce a planned range of product classes and product models, with a product model being a speci…c variant within a product class. They analyze the automotive industry and argue that the initial investment needed to implement a dedicated technology which allows a single engine to be produced is greater than the in-vestment needed to adopt a ‡exible technology which allows the production of several di¤erent engine models. We set our model in this context. Moreover, the investment needed to implement any technology is assumed to be exogenous, so we do not consider licensing of production technologies.
1 Röller and Tombak (1990) and Kim et al. (1992) propose a game in which …rms'owners choose between a ‡exible technology and a dedicated one. They examine market conditions under which strict pro…t-maximizer …rms would choose a ‡exible technology. They …nd that when the di¤erence in …xed costs between the two technologies (denoted as F ) is su¢ ciently low, both …rms adopt the ‡exible technology. By contrast, when F is su¢ ciently high, neither …rm adopts the ‡exible technology. The asymmetric equilibrium in which only one …rm adopts the ‡exible technology does not exist when products are substitutes.
They …nd that consumer (producer) surplus is largest when both …rms adopt the ‡exible (dedicated) technology. However, the results on total surplus depend on the value of parameter F . In general, the larger the value of F , the lower the bene…t that the economy obtains from the adoption of ‡exible technologies.
As a result, a welfare-maximizer agent would encourage both …rms to adopt the ‡exible technology for low enough values of F and the dedicated technology for high enough values of F: There are no values of F for which one …rm adopting the ‡exible technology and the other …rm the dedicated one maximizes total surplus.
By contrast, our model takes into account the fact that owners'delegation of production decisions to managers has strategic e¤ects which modify equilibrium outcomes. We consider an oligopolistic industry consisting of two …rms that produce a di¤erentiated product in which …rms'owners have to choose the incentive contracts that are given to managers. We analyze how those incentive contracts a¤ect the production technology choice in the context of Röller and Tombak (1990) . Let us brie ‡y explain how strategic delegation in ‡uences the production technology choice. As in Röller and Tombak (1990) and Kim et al.
(1992), we …nd that when F is su¢ ciently low (high), both …rms adopt the ‡exible (dedicated) production technology. However, unlike under strict pro…t maximization, when …rms'owners delegate production decisions the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one …rm adopts the ‡exible technology does exist when products are substitutes. We also …nd that the incentives to adopt the ‡ex-ible technology are smaller than under strict pro…t maximization. The intuition behind these results lies in the fact that the lower marginal cost of production considered by …rms' managers under strategic delegation results in …rms producing a larger quantity of each product than in the strict pro…t maximization case. This increases market competition and, therefore …rms's pro…ts decrease.
Consequently, the incentive to specialize in one product is larger under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization since the adoption of the dedicated technology decreases market competition. It must be noted that when a …rm adopts the ‡exible technology, it produces two goods that are substitutes.
However, a …rm adopting the dedicated technology serves only one market.
We also extend the analysis on welfare implications considered by Röller and Tombak (1990) since the expression they use to measure consumer surplus is valid only when products are independent in demand. When analyzing the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcomes we …nd that market competition leads to a lower adoption of ‡exible technologies under strategic delegation and a higher adoption under strict pro…t maximization than the adoption level needed to maximize total surplus. Moreover, the range of parameter values for which the equilibrium technology choice is non-e¢ cient is larger under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization.
In this work, we characterize manufacturing ‡exibility in terms of the possibility of producing di¤erent products. By contrast, Tseng (2003) focuses on the manufacturing ‡exibility that allows a …rm to produce with shorter expected delivery times. The …rm that makes the fastest delivery can sell the product at a given price, while …rms who do not deliver …rst must sell their product at discount prices. Some other studies introduce uncertainty when analyzing technology adoption (see Anderson and Engers (1994) , Hoppe (2000) and Götz (2000) ).
In a context of managerial delegation, Bárcena-Ruiz and Olaizola (2004) examine …rms'incentives to choose between dedicated production technologies which have di¤erent characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the general features of a di¤erentiated duopoly model under strategic delegation. In Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium under strict pro…t maximization and strategic delegation and analyze how owners'delegation of production decisions to managers a¤ects the equilibrium outcome. In Section 4 we study the welfare implications of our model. Lastly, Section 5 presents some conclusions.
The model
We consider a single industry consisting of two …rms (1 and 2) that can produce two di¤erentiated products (A and B). Two markets exist, one for product A and one for product B. Each …rm can choose between two di¤erent production technologies: a ‡exible manufacturing system (denoted by subscript f ), which allows …rms to produce both products, and a dedicated equipment (denoted by subscript d), which limits production to only one of the two products.
We consider marginal cost of production, denoted as c, as being equal for both technologies.
2 The …xed costs associated with each technology are F f for the ‡exible technology and F d for the dedicated technology, with
Without loss of generality we normalize F d to zero and denote F f = F . Hence, F represents the di¤erence in …xed costs between the two technologies.
Following Vives (1985) , our model considers a representative consumer that 2 Röller and Tombak (1990) justify this assumption by empirical observation.
maximizes a quadratic utility function of the form:
where I represents a numeraire good. The …rst order conditions for the utility maximization problem lead to the following inverse demand system:
where p k and q
are the price and the total quantity of product k, respectively, and q l = q l 1 +q l 2 denotes the total quantity of product l: We assume 0 b < 1 and products A and B are thus considered as substitutes with the own price e¤ect dominating the cross price e¤ect.
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If both …rms choose the dedicated technology, we set without loss of generality that …rm i enters market A and …rm j market B (i.e. q Each …rm's owner delegates production decisions to a risk neutral manager.
As in Fershtman and Judd (1987) , we consider linear incentive contracts that are a function of pro…ts and sales revenue. The contract is such that …rm i's manager (i = 1; 2) receives a payo¤ i +B i O i , where i and B i > 0 are constant and O i is a linear combination of pro…ts and sales revenue. The terms i and B i are chosen by …rm i's owner so that the manager only gets his opportunity cost, which is normalized to zero. The contract must be legally enforceable, irreversible and observable. Formally, …rm i's manager will be given an incentive to maximize:
are …rm i's pro…ts and sales revenue, respectively, and i is the incentive parameter chosen 3 The model can easily be extended to assume complementary products by considering 1 < b < 0:
by …rm i's owner. We make no restrictions on i : Rewriting (1) we obtain:
As (2) shows, …rm i's manager considers i c as the marginal cost of production for each good. As a result, if …rm i's owner chooses i < 1 ( i > 1) ; the marginal cost of production considered by his manager is lower (larger) than that considered by a pro…t-maximizer …rm. In this way, …rm i's owner makes his manager more (less) aggressive, i.e. his manager produces a higher (lower) output level than under strict pro…t maximization.
We model the study of production technology choice under strategic delegation as a game in three stages. In the …rst stage, owners simultaneously choose the production technology. In the second stage, owners simultaneously determine the incentive structure for their managers. Finally, in the third stage, managers simultaneously take production decisions, with each …rm's manager knowing his incentive contract and that of the competing manager. We assume that managers are perfectly aware of the nature of demand and costs. The above timing of decisions is based on the fact that the production technology choice is a more long-term decision than the setting of managers'incentives. the two technologies we assume that it chooses the ‡exible one.
We next characterize the equilibria.
Characterization of the equilibria
To show how strategic delegation a¤ects …rms'decisions, we consider …rst the simple pro…t maximization case.
Benchmark case: Pro…t-maximizer …rms
In this case we have a two stage game. In the …rst stage, owners simultaneously choose the production technology. And in the second stage owners simultaneously choose outputs.
In stage two, …rm i's owner chooses q A i and q B i to maximize i taking the competitor's quantities, q A j and q B j ; as …xed. 4 We solve this second stage of the game for each case in Figure 1 . This problem leads to the equilibrium quantities and pro…ts given in Table 1 .
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Taking into account the outcomes described in Table 1 , in the …rst stage of the game, …rms' owners simultaneously choose the production technology.
Solving this …rst stage we obtain the following result. 6 Let:
where F 1 is the investment needed to adopt the ‡exible technology such that
Lemma 1 When …rms' owners do not delegate production decisions to managers, in equilibrium:
i) Both …rms choose the ‡exible technology if F F 1 :
ii) Both …rms choose the dedicated technology if F > F 1 :
4 It must be noted that, without loss of generality, our model assumes q B i = q A j = 0 when both …rms adopt the dedicated technology and q B j = 0 when …rm i adopts the ‡exible technology and …rm j adopts the dedicated one.
5 All tables are relegated to the appendix. 6 The same result is given by Röller and Tombak (1990) and Kim et al. (1992) .
As Lemma 1 shows, if parameter F is su¢ ciently low (F F 1 ) both …rms adopt the ‡exible technology. The reason is that due to the low investment that the adoption of the ‡exible technology requires in this case, neither …rm …nds it pro…table to lock itself out of half of the market. By contrast, if parameter F is su¢ ciently high (F > F 1 ) both …rms adopt the dedicated technology. In this case, due to the high investment that the adoption of the ‡exible technology requires, neither …rm …nds it pro…table to serve both markets. In this way, each …rm will be a monopolist in one market. 7 Note that one …rm adopting the ‡exible technology and the other …rm adopting the dedicated technology cannot be an equilibrium in this case.
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It can be shown that F 1 decreases with b and increases with a. As a result, the lower parameter b and the higher parameter a, the biggger the incentive to adopt the ‡exible technology. As Röller and Tombak (1990) note, one can interpret a low b as the situation in which the two products are perceived by consumers as being highly di¤erentiated. When this is the case any …rm choosing the dedicated technology locks itself out of almost half of the market, hence the natural tendency to invest in a ‡exible technology. A high a represents large markets, encouraging more active participation of …rms in both markets. By contrast, the higher parameter b and the lower parameter a, the larger the incentive to adopt the dedicated technology. Thus, when the two products are perceived by consumers as being close substitutes, …rms tend to specialize in one product. A low a represents small markets, discouraging the active participation of …rms in both markets.
be the investment needed to adopt the ‡exible technology such that (df ) = (f f ) : When F 1 < F < F 2 , two equilibria exist: (dd) and (f f ). However, it can easily be seen that (dd) > (f f ) for all F . Consequently, equilibrium (dd) Pareto dominates equilibrium (f f ).
8 Considering complementary products ( 1 < b < 0) we have that F 1 > F 2 : Thus, for F 2 < F F 1 it is possible to obtain (f d) and (df ) equilibria with complementary products (see Kim et al. (1992) ).
Strategic delegation
When …rms'owners hire managers to take production decisions we have a three stage game. In the …rst stage, owners simultaneously choose the production technology. In the second stage, owners simultaneously determine the incentive structure for their managers. Finally, in the third stage, managers simultaneously choose outputs.
In stage three, …rm i's manager chooses q 
j ; i 6 = j; i; j = 1; 2: Solving this third stage of the game for all cases we obtain the following results:
If both …rms adopt the ‡exible technology:
If both …rms adopt the dedicated technology:
If …rm i adopts the ‡exible technology and …rm j the dedicated one:
Taking into account the results obtained in the third stage of the game, in the second stage, …rm i's owner chooses the incentive parameter of his manager, i , that maximizes his …rm's pro…t taking the competitor's incentive parameter, j ; as …xed. Solving this problem we obtain the equilibrium quantities, pro…ts and incentive parameters given by Table 2 . Note that i < 1 for all equilibria.
Consequently, …rm i's manager considers a lower marginal cost of production than a pro…t-maximizer …rm. Thus, …rm i's owner makes his manager more aggressive (i.e. his manager produces a larger quantity of each product) than a pro…t-maximizer …rm.
We can also check that acts as a monopolist in its own market and thus each …rm's owner encourages his manager to behave non-aggressively. Hence the largest value of the incentive parameter for (dd) equilibrium. On the other hand, when a …rm chooses the ‡exible technology its manager must decide the output level of the two products.
Since we are considering substitute products, this manager must internalize the fact that the two goods he produces compete in the same market. As a result, when the other …rm adopts the ‡exible technology, a …rm's owner will provide less aggressive incentives to his manager if adopting the ‡exible technology rather than the dedicated one, i.e. (f f ) > (df ). Lastly, a …rm that adopts the ‡exible technology will be more aggressive if the other …rm also adopts the ‡exible technology due to the greater market competition that this situation
Taking into account the outcomes described in Table 2 , in the …rst stage of the game …rms' owners simultaneously choose the production technology.
Solving this …rst stage we obtain the following result. Let:
9 Bárcena-Ruiz and Espinosa (1997) analyze a related question. By considering multiproduct …rms, they study whether …rms'owners delegate all production decisions to one manager (i.e. they centralize production decisions) or each good's production decision is delegated to a di¤erent manager (i.e. they decentralize production decisions). They show that when goods are substitutes, …rms behave more aggressively in the product markets if production decisions are decentralized.
where F 1s and F 2s (F 1s > F 2s ) are the investments needed to adopt the ‡exible
Proposition 1 When …rms'owners delegate production decisions to managers, in equilibrium:
i) Both …rms choose the ‡exible technology if F min fF 1s ; F 2s g :
ii) Only one …rm chooses the ‡exible technology if F 2s < F F 1s :
iii) Both …rms choose the dedicated technology if F > F 1s :
10 Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium outcome induced by market competition depends on both the degree of product substitutability (parameter b) and the di¤erence in …xed costs between the two technologies (parameter F ). being close substitutes …rms tend to specialize in one product regardeless of the di¤erence in …xed cost between the two technologies. 11 However, when products are perceived by consumers as being su¢ ciently di¤erentiated (b < 0:5584), if 1 0 When F 1s < F < F 2s two equilibria exist: (dd) and (f f ). However, it can easily be seen that (dd) > (f f ) for all F . Consequently, equilibrium (dd) Pareto dominates equilibrium (f f ). for which (f d) and (df ) equilibria can be supported (i.e. only one …rm adopts the ‡exible technology). Thus, unlike under strict pro…t maximization, when …rms' owners delegate quantity decisions asymmetric equilibria do exist when products are substitutes. We …nd various reasons for the existence of these asymmetric equilibria. A low degree of product substitutability leads to low competition between the two products, hence the large incentive of …rms to serve both markets. However, due to the lower marginal cost of production considered by …rms' managers under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization, …rms produce a larger quantity of each product. This leads to a higher market competition and therefore, to smaller pro…ts for …rms. Moreover, we have seen that (f d) > (df ) which means that a …rm that adopts the dedicated technology behaves more aggressively than a …rm that adopts the ‡exible one. As a result, the latter …rm obtains a greater market share than the former in the market in which the two …rms compete. On the other hand, the …rm that adopts the ‡exible technology is a monopolist in one of the markets. In this case, parameter b is low enough (b<0.1649) and thus the …rm that adopts the dedicated technology has a strategic advantage in the market in which the two …rms compete while the …rm that adopts the ‡exible technology has a strategic advantage in the market in which it is a monopolist. Therefore, for intermediate values of F (F 2s < F F 1s ) only one …rm adopts the ‡exible technology.
We can also check that both F 1s and F 2s increase with a: Hence, when markets are large, …rms tend to invest in the ‡exible technology while if markets are small, …rms tend to specialize in one product.
Next we compare the results obtained for both the strict pro…t maximization
Comparison of results
From Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 When …rms' owners do not delegate production decisions to managers, the incentives to adopt the ‡exible technology are at least as large as under strategic delegation. 
These results will be of use in the interpretation of Proposition 2. If F > F 1 , the two …rms adopt the dedicated technology under both strict pro…t maximization and strategic delegation. If F min fF 1s ; F 2s g, the two …rms adopt the ‡exible technology in both cases. If F 1s < F F 1 , both …rms adopt the dedicated technology under strategic delegation while both …rms choose the ‡exible technology under strict pro…t maximization. Lastly, if F 2s < F F 1s , only one …rm adopts the ‡exible technology under strategic delegation while both …rms adopt it under strict pro…t maximization. We can thus conclude that when …rms'owners do not delegate production decisions, the incentives to adopt the ‡exible technology are at least as great as under strategic delegation. The intuition behind the above result is that due to the lower marginal cost of production considered by …rms'managers under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization, …rms produce a larger quantity 1 2 The same result is obtained when considering complementary products.
of each product. This increases market competition and therefore, …rms'pro…ts decrease. Consequently, the di¤erence in …xed cost between the two technologies that a …rm can a¤ord when adopting the ‡exible technology is smaller under strategic delegation. As a result, a …rm's incentive to specialize in one product (i.e. to be a monopolist in its own market) is at least as great under strategic delegation as under strict pro…t maximization.
Welfare implications
Given that we consider a representative consumer that maximizes a quadratic utility function, consumer surplus is:
where q A and q B are the total equilibrium quantities of products A and B, respectively. Producer surplus, denoted as P S; is given by the sum of …rms'
pro…ts. Total surplus (welfare), denoted as W; is the sum of CS and P S:
We next analyze CS, P S and W under strict pro…t maximization and strategic delegation. We …rst study the strict pro…t maximization case.
Benchmark case: Pro…t-maximizer …rms
Consumer, producer and total surpluses under strict pro…t maximization are given in Table 3 . Straightforward computations lead to the following result.
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Let: 
1 3 This section extends the analysis on welfare implications considered by Röller and Tombak (1990) since the expression they use to measure consumer surplus is valid only when the two goods are independent in demand (b = 0).
Lemma 2 When …rms' owners do not delegate production decisions to managers, we obtain that CS (f f ) > CS (f d) > CS (dd) and P S (dd) > P S (f d) > P S (f f ).
As Lemma 2 shows, consumer surplus is highest when both …rms adopt the ‡exible technology and lowest when both …rms adopt the dedicated one. Thus, consumers bene…t from the adoption of the ‡exible technology since market competition is stronger when a …rm adopts this technology (i.e. serves the two markets) rather than choosing the dedicated one (i.e. serving only one market).
Moreover, it can easily be shown that CS (f f ) ; CS (f d) and CS (dd) are all decreasing in b: Thus, consumers bene…t from highly di¤erentiated markets. On the other hand, due to the stronger market competition that the adoption of the ‡exible technology implies, the producer surplus is highest when both …rms adopt the dedicated technology and lowest when both …rms adopt the ‡exible one. Thus, producers bene…t from the adoption of dedicated technologies: However, from Lemma 1 we know that both …rms decide to adopt the dedicated technology if and only if F > F 1 holds. As Röller and Tombak (1990) We next analyze total surplus. It is easy to see that if F F
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 3 When …rms' owners do not delegate production decisions to managers, total surplus is highest if both …rms adopt the ‡exible technology when 14 1 4 If we consider complementary products then F w 3 > F w 2 > F w 1 : In this case, total surplus is highest in (f f ) when F F w 1 ; in (df ) when F w 1 < F F w 3 and in (dd) when F > F w 3 :
We know from Lemma 2 that consumers bene…t from the adoption of ‡exible technologies while producers bene…t from the adoption of dedicated technologies. So, Proposition 3 states that as long as the di¤erence in …xed costs between the two technologies is su¢ ciently low, the bene…t that consumers obtain from …rms'adoption of ‡exible technologies is high enough to o¤set the loss that …rms sustain. However, for large values of F , the adoption of ‡exible technologies induces a producer surplus decrease which overtakes the bene…t that consumers obtain. Note that since total surplus includes the sum of pro…ts of the two …rms, total surplus does not consider the strategic e¤ects that arise from the choice of technology made by …rms'owners. These results together with Lemma 1 lead to the following.
Proposition 4 When …rms' owners do not delegate production decisions to managers, the equilibrium technology chosen by …rms'owners is non-e¢ cient if and only if F w 2 < F < F 1 .
We know from Lemma 1 that for F > F 1 (F F 1 ) both …rms adopt the dedicated ( ‡exible) technology. On the other hand, Proposition 3 states that maximum total surplus is reached if both …rms adopt the dedicated ( ‡exible) technology when F > F w 2 (F F w 2 ). Moreover, it can be shown that F 1 > F w 2 : Consequently, we can conclude the following. When F > F 1 (F F w 2 ) ; market competition induces both …rms to adopt the dedicated ( ‡exible) technology and total surplus is maximum. When F w 2 < F F 1 ; both …rms choose the ‡exible technology although the situation in which both …rms adopt the dedicated one yields the maximum total surplus. Therefore, in this last case market competition leads to a non-e¢ cient outcome. 15 Let us interpret this result. As we have seen, when F w 2 < F F 1 ; market forces lead to equilibrium (f f ). On the other hand, we know that the adoption of ‡exible technologies yields a transfer 1 5 It can be shown that @ F 1 F w 2 =@b < 0 and consequently the closer substitutes the products are, the smaller the range of values of parameter F is for which the equilibrium induced by market competition is non-e¢ cient.
of surplus from producers to consumers. However, when F w 2 < F F 1 , the larger production that the adoption of the ‡exible technology implies is not high enough for the consumer surplus increase to o¤set both the producer surplus decrease and the di¤erence in …xed cost between the two technologies. It must be noted that in this case a welfare-maximizer agent prefers less market competition than in the equilibrium outcome.
We now turn to the strategic delegation case.
Strategic delegation
Consumer, producer and total surpluses under strategic delegation are given in Table 4 . Straightforward computations lead to the following result. Let:
where F 
Lemma 3 When …rms' owners delegate production decisions to managers, we
Lemma 3 shows that consumer surplus is highest when both …rms adopt the ‡exible technology and lowest when both …rms adopt the dedicated one while producer surplus is highest when both …rms adopt the dedicated technology and lowest when both …rms adopt the ‡exible one. Thus, like under strict pro…t maximization, consumers bene…t from the adoption of ‡exible technologies while producers bene…t from the adoption of dedicated technologies. However, Proposition 1 states that both …rms decide to adopt the dedicated technology if and only if F > F 1s holds. As a result, as under strict pro…t maximization, market forces driving the introduction of ‡exible technologies yield a transfer of surplus from producers to consumers.
We next analyze total surplus. It is easy to see that if F F
Proposition 5 When …rms'owners delegate production decisions to managers, total surplus is highest if both …rms adopt the ‡exible technology when F F 
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Lemma 3 states that consumers bene…t from the adoption of ‡exible technologies while producers bene…t from the adoption of dedicated technologies.
When analyzing total surplus, we …nd that as long as F is su¢ ciently low, the bene…t that consumers obtain from …rms' adoption of ‡exible technologies is high enough to o¤set the loss that …rms sustain. However, for su¢ ciently large values of F , the adoption of ‡exible technologies induces too high a producer surplus decrease which overtakes the bene…t that consumers obtain. As a result, Proposition 5 states that the e¢ cient outcome is (f f ) when F is su¢ ciently small (F F w 1s ) and (dd) when F is su¢ ciently large (F > F w 3s ). For intermediate values of F (F w 1s < F F w 3s ), the e¢ cient outcome is reached when only one …rm adopts the ‡exible technology, i.e. (f d). It must be noted that under strict pro…t maximization there is no range of values of F for which (f d) yields the maximum total surplus. This can be explained by the fact that under strategic delegation …rms behave more aggressively than under strict pro…t maximization. As a result, for a given technology state, consumer surplus is higher and producer surplus is lower under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization. This means that there exist intermediate values of F for which the consumer surplus increase that both …rms'adoption of the ‡exible technology induces is not large enough to o¤set the producer surplus decrease. However, if one …rm adopts the ‡exible technology, the output increase is large enough for the consumer surplus increase to o¤set the loss that …rms sustain. These results together with Proposition 1, which characterizes the equilibria under strategic delegation, lead to Proposition 6. Figure 4 summarizes the results in Propositions 1 and 5.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE]
Proposition 6 When …rms'owners delegate production decisions to managers, the equilibrium technology chosen by …rms' owners is non-e¢ cient if and only if min fF 1s ; F 2s g < F < F w 3s :
Taking into account the results in Propositions 1 and 5 (see Figure 4 ) we obtain the following. When F min fF 1s ; F 2s g ; both …rms adopt the ‡exible technology and total surplus is maximum. When F 2s < F F 1s ; only one …rm adopts the ‡exible technology while the adoption of the ‡exible technology by the two …rms maximizes total surplus. When F > F 1s ; neither …rm adopts the ‡exible technology. However, (f f ) yields the maximum total surplus when F 1s < F F w 1s , (f d) yields the maximum total surplus when F w 1s < F F w 3s and lastly, (dd) leads to the maximum total surplus when F > F w 3s . Therefore, when min fF 1s ; F 2s g < F F w 3s market competition leads to a non-e¢ cient outcome while all other cases lead to an e¢ cient outcome.
17 Let us interpret the results shown in this proposition. As we have seen, the greater market competition induced by strategic delegation yields a larger incentive to adopt the dedicated technology than in the strict pro…t maximization case since the adoption of ‡exible technologies leads to even greater market competition. Moreover, the 1 7 It can be shown that both @ F w 3s F 2s =@b and @ F w 3s F 1s =@b are negative and therefore, the closer substitutes the products are, the smaller the range of values of parameter F is for which the equilibrium induced by market competition is non-e¢ cient.
higher production that the adoption of the ‡exible technology implies under strategic delegation is large enough for the consumer surplus increase to o¤set both the producer surplus decrease and the di¤erence in …xed cost between the two technologies. It must be noted that a welfare-maximizer agent prefers a greater adoption of the ‡exible technology than that chosen by …rms' owners.
Then, in contrast with the result obtained for the strict pro…t maximization case, market competition induces a lower adoption of ‡exible technologies under strategic delegation than the level that maximizes social welfare.
Next we compare the results under strict pro…t maximization and strategic delegation.
Comparison of results
We …rst analyze whether a welfare-maximizer agent would prefer more adoption of ‡exible technologies under strategic delegation or under strict pro…t maximization. Comparing Propositions 3 and 5 we obtain the following result.
Proposition 7 From a total surplus maximization point of view, the ‡exible technology should be at least as widely adopted under strategic delegation as under strict pro…t maximization.
Proposition 3 states that under strict pro…t maximization, the maximum total surplus is induced by (f f ) when F F ; which leads to Proposition 7. The intuition behind this result is the following. Under strategic delegation …rms behave more aggressively than under strict pro…t maximization. Market competition is thus greater under strategic delegation.
Consequently, consumer surplus increases (and producer surplus decreases) with the introduction of ‡exible technologies relatively more under strategic delega-tion than under strict pro…t maximization. As a result, the di¤erence in …xed cost between the two technologies that a welfare-maximizer agent accepts for adopting the ‡exible technology is larger under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization.
We next compare the range of parameter values for which the equilibrium outcomes induced by strict pro…t maximization and strategic delegation are none¢ cient. From Propositions 4 and 6 we see that under strategic delegation (strict pro…t maximization) a welfare-maximizer agent would induce a higher (lower) adoption of ‡exible technologies than that chosen by …rms'owners. This result can be explained by the fact that under strategic delegation …rms behave more aggressively and market competition is thus greater than under strict pro…t maximization. As a result, consumer surplus is higher and producer surplus is lower when …rms' owners delegate production decisions. The adoption of ‡exible technologies leads to even greater market competition, hence the …rms' tendency for a lower (from an e¢ ciency point of view) adoption of ‡exible technologies under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization.
Moreover, when analyzing the parameter values for which equilibrium outcomes are e¢ cient we …nd the following. states that when …rms'owners do not delegate production decisions, the equilibrium technology choice is non-e¢ cient if and only if F w 2 < F < F 1 . On the other hand, from Proposition 6 we know that when …rms'owners delegate production decisions, the equilibrium technology choice is non-e¢ cient if and only if min fF 1s ; F 2s g < F < F w 3s . It can also be veri…ed that F w 3s > F 1 > F w 2 > min fF 1s ; F 2s g : As a result, the range of values of parameters b and F for which the equilibrium technology choice is non-e¢ cient is larger under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization. The intuition behind this result is the following. Under strategic delegation …rms behave more aggressively than under strict pro…t maximization which, in turn, leads to greater market competition. Consequently, consumer (producer) surplus increases (decreases) with the introduction of ‡exible technologies relatively more under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization. The larger consumer surplus increase under strategic delegation leads to a larger incentive to adopt ‡exible technologies from a welfare maximization point of view. By contrast, the larger producer surplus decrease under strategic delegation leads to a lower incentive to adopt ‡exible technologies through market competition. Hence the grater range of parameter values for which under strategic delegation the equilibrium outcome and the e¢ cient outcome do not coincide.
Conclusions
In this work we analyze how strategic incentives can a¤ect …rms' pro…ts from the adoption of ‡exible technologies. We study a managerial delegation model consisting of two …rms that can produce two di¤erentiated products. Firms can choose between ‡exible and dedicated production technologies. We …nd that the incentives to adopt ‡exible technologies are smaller when …rms'owners delegate production decisions to managers than in the strict pro…t maximization case. The intuition behind this result is that due to the lower marginal cost of production considered by …rms'managers under strategic delegation when they compete by setting quantities, …rms produce a larger quantity of each product than under strict pro…t maximization. This increases market competition and therefore …rms's pro…ts decrease. Consequently, the incentive to specialize in one product is larger under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization since when a …rm adopts the dedicated technology, it produces only one good and market competition thus decreases. It can be shown that the in-centive to specialize in one product is also larger under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization when considering complementary products.
We also study the welfare implications of our model. We …nd that the introduction of ‡exible production technologies increases consumer surplus and decreases producer surplus under both strict pro…t maximization and strategic delegation. However, the results on total surplus depend on the di¤erence in …xed costs between the two technologies (denoted as F ). In general, the larger the value of parameter F is, the lower the bene…t is that the economy obtains from the adoption of ‡exible technologies.
When analyzing the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcome induced by market competition we …nd that market competition induces a lower adoption of ‡exible technologies under strategic delegation and a higher adoption under strict pro…t maximization than the level that maximizes social welfare. However, the range of parameter values for which the equilibrium technology choice is non-e¢ cient is larger under strategic delegation than under strict pro…t maximization. Table 1 Equilibrium under strict pro…t maximization Table 2 Equilibrium under strategic delegation Table 3 Consumer, producers and total surplus under strict pro…t maximization Table 4 Consumer, producers and total surplus under strategic delegation 
